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OBSERVATIONS ON THE LAW OF IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF QUALITY IN MISSOURI: 1960
EDMOND R. ANDERSON, JR.t
Certain Missouri cases on implied warranty of quality1 have been
unsatisfactory and behind the times. McIntyre v. Kansas City Coca-
Cola Bottling Co.-" and Barton v. Dowis3 are particularly difficult to
accept. The McIntyre case held that a two-year old infant daughter
of a parent buyer from a retailer could not recover damages in an
action against the bottling company for serious injuries resulting
from an explosion of the bottle while she was carrying it. 4 The Barton
case held that an implied warranty that hogs were fit for breeding
purposes provided no warranty that the hogs would not communicate
hog cholera to plaintiff's hogs. Plaintiff lost 113 of his 133 hogs by
reason of contact with six of defendant seller's "fit" breeders.
In fairness to these courts, it may be said that there was at one time
a doctrine of caveat emptor in such sales transactions. The Missouri
Legislature has done nothing to correct the matter, having failed to
enact even the Uniform Sales Act, which is deemed to have strength-
ened and extended the law of implied warranty of quality in some of
the states which have enacted it.5 Also, the United States Court for
the Western District of Missouri in the McIntyre case was forced to
apply the law of Missouri as best it could determine that law under
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1. No attempt is made herein to consider express warranties as such. A leading
case on the subject is Turner v. Central Hardware Co., 353 Mo. 1182, 186 S.W.2d
603 (1945). Cf. Froedtert Grain & Malting Co. v. Steelcote Mfg. Co., 110 F. Supp.
757 (E.D. Mo. 1953); Green v. Cooke Sales & Serv., 284 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. Ct. App.
1955); Witte v. Cooke Tractor Co., 261 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953). Also,
no attempt is made to consider the effect of disclaimer clauses. In that respect
see Davies v. Motor Radio Co., 236 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951); Laitner
Plumbing & Heating Co. v. McThomas, 61 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933).
2. 85 F. Supp. 708 (W.D. Mo. 1949), appeal dismissed, 184 F.2d 671 (8th Cir.
1950).
3. 315 Mo. 226, 285 S.W. 988 (1926).
4. The plaintiffs were, however, permitted to recast their complaints so as to
state a claim in tort. Of course, the proof is much tougher in a tort action even
with the help of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. On virtually the same facts in
Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953) the action on behalf of the
infant was allowed on an implied warranty theory.
5i. The St. S. Angelo Toso, 271 Fed. 245 (3d Cir. 1921); Ryan v. Progressive
Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931); Keenan v. Cherry & Webb,
47 R.I. 125, 131 Atl. 309 (1925).
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the Erie doctrine.6 The McIntyre court believed the result it reached
was necessary under the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in State
ex rel. Jones Store Co. v. Shain7 at least as that case was interpreted
by the late Professor Lee-Carl Overstreet 8 in an article in the Missouri
Law Review.9 In Professor Overstreet's view, the Jones Store case
could have been interpreted as shattering the law of implied warranty
of quality in iMissouri, and he termed it "a shocking surprise."1° It
has not had that result nor was it intended to do so; it has been over-
emphasized and, at the most, is only one case among many. As will
be shown below, it fits properly in the whole picture.
More recent cases indicate a strengthened and extended law of im-
plied warranty of quality in Missouri. Two of these cases11 deserve
close consideration.
THE PHILIP MORRIS AND M.F.A. MILLING Co. CASES
Plaintiff John T. Ross, in an action against Philip Morris Co.,
which was removed to the United States Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Missouri by reason of diversity of citizenship, alleged that
from 1948 to 1952, inclusive, he purchased cigarettes manufactured by
defendant and smoked them, that because said cigarettes were not
wholesome and fit, but contained "unwholesome, poisonous, deleteri-
ous, irritating, harmful and injurious" substances and ingredients, he
sustained serious, permanent and progressive injuries and damages.
In count one, he alleged that defendant sold cigarettes through re-
tailers, in sealed packages designed for ultimate consumption and for
the particular and only purpose that said cigarettes be smoked and
consumed by human beings; that defendant knew and intended that
they would be purchased and consumed by the general public and
6. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947);
applicable in diversity of citizenship cases.
7. 352 Mo. 630, 179 S.W.2d 19 (1944), quashing Marra v. Jones Store Co.,
170 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943). A buyer of a colored satin blouse could not
maintain a damages action against the retail seller for skin injuries allegedly
caused by some substance in the blouse, for the reason that a blouse has no special
or particular purpose, thus rendering inapplicable an implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose. The case is discussed broadly at notes 45-55, infra.
8. The author now has the honor of teaching the courses at Missouri University
that Professor Overstreet taught prior to his death in 1955.
9. Overstreet, Some Aspects of Implied Warranties in the Supreme Court of
Missouri, 10 Mo. L. Rev. 147 (1945). This is the most comprehensive article
published on the matter of implied warranties in Missouri.
10. Id. at 148.
11. Ross v. Philip Moris Co., 164 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mo. 1958), modified,
No. 9494, W.D. Mo., Oct. 22, 1959; Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320
S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959).
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thereby warranted and represented to the general public, and par-
ticularly to the ultimate purclaser-consumer, that said cigarettes were
wholesome and fit for human consumption when, in fact, such ciga-
rettes when smoked and consumed were not wholesome and fit, but
were dangerous and unsafe. Thus Ross proceeded on a theory of
breach of an implied warranty of fitness or wholesomeness of the
cigarettes for human consumption. The United States District Court
sustained defendant's motion for summary judgment on this implied
warranty count.1 The court felt bound so to rule by the Jones Store
and McIntyre cases,- despite intermediate Missouri courts of ap-
peals decisions recognizing liability in the absence of privity in cases
involving defective products manufactured and sold for human con-
sumption.' 4 The court stated:
The only difference between the situation considered in the
McIntyre case, supra, and the case at bar is that plaintiff here
undertakes to bring cigarettes within the food and drink cases,
supra. As to this, we only say that if a lady's blouse containing
a deleterious dye, injurious to health, is not a particular object
that is the subject matter of a contract, as to which the doctrine
of implied warranty is applicable, then plaintiff's attempt to
bring cigarettes within the food and drink cases as distinguished
from an object of ordinary retail sale, is futile.'5
In Midwest Gamze Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co.,'r plaintiffs 7 alleged they
were owners of trout farms and in the business of raising trout for
commercial purposes; that defendant sold them prepared "dry" fish
food packaged, labeled and similar in appearance to available "com-
plete" fish foods manufactured by others; that by established and
prevailing trade custom, manufacturers of such "dry" fish foods were,
and for some time prior to plaintiffs' use of defendant's product had
been, marketing only "complete" fish foods, all of which was known
to defendant or in the exercise of ordinary prudence should have been
12. Ross v. Philip Morris Co., supra note 11. The court overruled defendant's
motion for summary judgment as to count two (a claim in tort for negligence)
and count three (a claim for fraud and deceit).
13. Id. at 691.
14. Representative of such cases are: Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 285
S.W.2d 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955); Foley v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 215 S.W.2d 314
(Mo. Ct. App. 1948); Helms v. General Baking Co., 164 S.W.2d 150 (Mo. Ct. App.
1942); Carter v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 139 S.W.2d 1025 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940);
McNicholas v. Continental Baking Co., 112 S.W.2d 849 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938);
Nemela v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 104 S.W.2d 773 (Mo. Ct. App. 1937); Madouros
v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445 (1936).
15. 164 F. Supp. at 691.
16. 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959).
17. Midwest Game Co., Inc., owner of the Troutdale Ranch at Gravois Mills,
Mo., and Ozark Trout Farm, a corporation, of Fayetteville, Ark., each filing suit
in the Circuit Court of Greene County, Mo.
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known; that in violation of said trade custom defendant's fish food
was and is not a "complete" fish food, adequate without supplementa-
tion to sustain and promote the normal health and growth of fish;
that defendant thereby impliedly warranted that its product was a
"complete" fish food; that as a result of defendant's breach of trade
custom and usage, and in reliance on said trade custom and the de-
fendant's superior knowledge as to its product, plaintiffs purchased
and fed defendant's fish food to their trout and as a further result
thereof plaintiffs' fish became sickly, afflicted and died. Thus plain-
tiffs proceeded on a theory of breach of an implied warranty of fitness
for the purpose sold, i.e., that the fish food was a "complete" fish food.
The trial court sustained M.F.A. Milling Co.'s motions to dismiss the
petitions on the ground of failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and re-
manded the cases for trial, holding "that an implied warranty of fit-
ness may be annexed to a transaction by reason of a trade custom or
usage." $ The court further recognized that an implied warranty of
fitness can attach to the sale of food for animals, at least "in cases like
the instant one where the food is not in its raw state but has been
processed and packaged by the manufacturer."'19 Apparently, unlike
in the Philip Morris case, there was no absence of privity.20 The court
stated however:
It is an established rule that in a sale of food for immediate
human consumption there is generally an implied warranty that
the food is wholesome, is fit for the purpose, and is of mer-
chantable quality. And a buyer of packaged food products may
recover from the manufacturer upon an implied warranty of
fitness even though there is no express privity of contract between
the manufacturer and buyer. Carter v. St. Louis Dairy Co., Mo.
App., 139 S.W.2d 1025.21
This statement, while not obiter dictum, was not essential to the
decision. This was the first time the Supreme Court of Missouri had
given approval or even positive recognition to the holdings of a line
of Missouri courts of appeals decisions recognizing actions in food
and drink cases despite absence of privity.
22
The M.F.A. Milling Co. case had a rapid effect. The United States
Court for the Western District of Missouri entertained plaintiff Ross'
motion to set aside the order sustaining defendant's motion for sum-
18. 320 S.W.2d at 550.
19. Ibid. The court also recognized a cause of action on a negligence theory.
Id. at 552.
20. The problem of privity was neither considered by the court nor covered by
the facts in the case.
21. 320 S.W.2d at 550.
22. See note 14 supra.
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mary judgment on the implied warranty count in the Philip Morris
case. The ruling and memorandum opinion on that motion were is-
sued on October 22, 1959. The former opinion was vacated, and
Philip Morris Co.'s motion for summary judgment on the implied
warranty count was denied.2 The court quoted the above language
from the M.F.A. Milling Co. case. The court observed that "the Su-
preme Court of Missouri has now expressly ruled ... that an implied
warranty of fitness should attach, absent privity, in a case where food
is sold for human consumption 'not in its raw state but has been
processed by the manufacturer'. ' 24 The court then stated:
Thus, the latest decision of the Supreme Court of the State of
Missouri, in Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., supra,
seemingly can only be considered as stating a rule of law as to
implied warranty which covers the sale of goods for human con-
sumption, not previously announced by the Supreme Court of
Missouri but specifically approved and applied by the several
intermediate appellate courts of Missouri, and as to which doc-
trine there can now be no question as to the binding effect thereof
on this Court in a removed action such as the instant case.
Therefore, the opinion in Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling
Co., supra, expressly supports plaintiff's position here made,
namely, that a claim of breach of implied warranty of whole-
someness and fitness may be asserted under Missouri law in the
absence of privity, in that class of cases where products are sold
in original packages for human consumption, not in their raw
state, but after being processed by the manufacturer.
25
This decision on implied warranty of quality may well be the first
such ruling on a cigarette case anywhere to date.26 But, be that as it
may, the decision cannot be justified under existing Missouri law.
And of course, the United States Court for the Western District of
Missouri is bound to apply Missouri law in this diversity case under
the Erie doctrine.2 7
23. No. 9494, W.D. Mo., Oct. 22, 1959. The court may have been influenced by a
well-reasoned analysis of its prior ruling by Mr. John E. Burruss, Jr., which sub-
sequently appeared in the Missouri Law Review. Recent Cases, 24 Mo. L. Rev.
554 (1959). A simulated case on essentially the same facts was also argued in the
finals of Junior Case Club on Law Day, April 25, 1959 at Missouri University
Law School, so the matter was well aired.
24. Citing Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547, 550
(Mo. 1959).
25. No. 9494, W.D. Mo., Oct. 22, 1959.
26. The only other case involving injuries (death) caused by cigarettes that
has been found considering an implied warranty theory is Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 158 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1957), aff'd, 256 F.2d 464 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 875 (1958), which denied the warranty action under Massachu-
setts law.
27. See note 6 supra. Cf. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956),
applicable at the time of the rulings in the Philip Morris case.
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DECISIONS OF INTERMEDIATE MISSOURI COURTS OF APPEALS
RECOGNIZING LIABILITY IN THE ABSENCE OF PRIVITY IN CASES
INVOLVING DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS MANUFACTURED AND SOLD
FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION
The Supreme Court of Missouri in the M.F.A. Milling Co. case
cited Carter v. St. Louis Dairy Co.2 18 as authority for the "established
rule" that there was an implied warranty of fitness applicable to the
sale of packaged food products for immediate human consumption
despite the absence of privity between the defendant manufacturer
and plaintiff buyer. The Carter case so held, merely purporting to
follow prior cases. The St. Louis Court of Appeals in that case quoted
from McNicholas v. Continental Baking Co.,29 an earlier decision by
the same court. MeNicholas also merely purported to apply existing
case law. Though not strong cases themselves, Carter and MeNicholas
suggest that the rule is "established." A number of other courts of
appeals decisions apply this "established rule" with little or no
analysis of the privity problem 0 In none of these decisions is there
expressed any concern about whether the Supreme Court of Missouri
would approve or recognize the rule applied.
The Kansas City Court of Appeals in 1936 met the privity problem
in two cases.31 In the Madouros case, the court held a consumer of a
beverage in a closed container could maintain an action for breach of
an implied warranty that the contents were good and wholesome and
fit for human consumption in an action against the remote bottling
company. Liability was based upon "the demands of social justice"
and not "alone on privity of contract." These products are prepared
under the exclusive supervision of the manufacturer and the ultimate
consumer must take them as they are. Liability if dependent upon
28. 139 S.W.2d 1025 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940) (particles of glass in a bottle of
buttermilk swallowed by plaintiff).
29. 112 S.W.2d 849 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938) (particles of glass in a packaged loaf
of bread partially eaten by plaintiff).
30. Representative cases are: Leathers v. Sikeston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 286
S.W.2d 393 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956) (photographic film and silver nitrate therefrom
in sealed bottle of coca-cola swallowed by plaintiff) ; Strawn v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 234 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950) (mushy things in sealed bottle of coca-
cola swallowed by plaintiff); Helms v. General Baking Co., 164 S.W.2d 150 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1942) (particles of steel or wire in a packaged loaf of bread partially
eaten by plaintiff).
31. De Gouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100 S.W.2d 336
(1936) (large black fly in sealed can of salmon partially consumed by plaintiff);
Madouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d
445 (1936) (decomposed mouse in sealed bottle of coca-cola partially swallowed by
plaintiff). The Madouros case is commented on in 2 Mo. L. Rev. 73 (1937); cf.
25 Wash. U.L.Q. 293 (1940). The De Gouveia case is noted at 2 Mo. L. Rev. 235
and 370 (1937); cf. Comment, 1953 Wash. U.L.Q. 327.
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privity is not defeated: "privity of contract exists in the conscious-
ness and understanding of all right-thinking persons. 13 2 In the De
Gouveia case, the court refused to hold liable a wholesaler under an
implied warranty. The retailer, from whom plaintiff purchased the
food product, could be so held. The court distinguished Madouros
since there the defendant had manufactured the product. In De
Gouzeia, the wholesaler had received the sealed can with no oppor-
tunity to inspect it and thus was not responsible for its contents, even
though it bore a label reading "packed for" the wholesaler.
In Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,3 Houser, C.3 4 for the St.
Louis Court of Appeals, although reversing a recovery for failure of
proof, reaffirmed the liability of manufacturers to remote consumers
of packaged food products established in the numerous Missouri
courts of appeals decisions. The opinion stated:
We have re-examined the underlying reasons which support
this body of decisions. We find them sound, salutary and respon-
sive to the realities and demands of modern society. Considera-
tions of public policy, modern methods of manufacturing,
packaging and merchandising and the protection of the health
of the consuming public require that an obligation be placed
upon the manufacturer of Coca-Cola to see to it, at his peril,
that the product he offers the general public is fit for the
purpose for which it is intended, namely, human consumption.
The "demands of social justice" require that his liability should
be made absolute. Only the manufacturer or bottler can know
of the contents of the bottle. Intermediate handlers have no way
of knowing of adulteration. The product is designed for ultimate
consumption in its original container by an individual consumer.
... The consumer's remedy should not be made to depend upon
the "intricacies of the law of sales," the doctrine of privity of
contract, or the proof of negligence .... 3
In Worley i,. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co.,36 Anderson, J. for the
St. Louis Court of Appeals, although also reversing a recovery for
failure of proof, stated that an action could be maintained by a user
of washing detergent, causing skin injuries, against the manufac-
turer despite absence of privity. This strong opinion attacks the
contractual basis of a warranty action upon which the requirement of
privity is grounded, observing that the action originally sounded in
tort.3 ' The case is, however, based upon an express warranty ("And,
32. 230 Mo. App. at 283, 90 S.W.2d at 450.
33. 285 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955), noted in 4 St. Louis U.L.J. 207 (1956).
34. Judge Norwin D. Houser is now a Commissioner for the Supreme Court of
Missouri.
35. 285 S.W.2d at 55-56.
36. 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952).
37. Id. at 1120, 253 S.W.2d at 536. Cf. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps,
139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
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of course, Tide is kind to hands, too") and not upon an implied war-
ranty of fitness as were the other cases. "The alleged warranty was
printed on the box of Tide purchased."' 8 Thus the Worley case cannot
be .considered as having extended the implied warranty principle
allowing recovery in the packaged food products cases to washing
compounds for human use. In fact Reed v. Swift & Co.,3D decided
shortly after the Worley case apparently recognized its inapplicability
in an implied warranty action absent privity.40
None of the cases allowing an implied warranty action has any
bearing upon cigarettes for they have involved only packaged food
products. The "realities and demands of modern society" and "con-
siderations of public policy" support these decisions. Such factors
should not support a similar action for injuries caused by cigarettes.
The use or consumption of cigarettes sold in sealed packages is neither
demanded by modern society nor encouraged by considerations of
public policy. If, as Worley and Reed demonstrate, washing com-
pounds for human use are not within the packaged food products-
implied warranty doctrine, neither are cigarettes. The recent ruling
in the Philip Morris case cannot be grounded upon this line of de-
cisions of the intermediate Missouri courts of appeals.
But the principle of these cases does support recovery in the burst-
ing bottle situation of the McIntyre41 case; the infant-plaintiff there
should have been entitled to maintain an action against the bottling
company-manufacturer despite the absence of privity, unless an ex-
ploding bottle is to be treated differently from unfit contents in the
bottle. Such a differentiation is clearly behind the times.42 The Mc-
Intyre court apparently made no such differentiation. 43 Therefore,
under the Missouri courts of appeals decisions neither McIntyre nor
Philip Morris were correctly decided. If they are to stand at all,
some other basis in Missouri law must be found to support them.
38. Id. at 1122, 253 S.W.2d at 537-38. Houser, C. for the same court in Williams
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 285 S.W.2d at 55, referred to the Worley case as "a
recent case involving express warranty."
39. 14 F.R.D. 145 (W.D. Mo. 1953).
40. The injuries were suffered in Kansas so the eourt considered liability
primarily with respect to Kansas law. Nevertheless, the court concluded that
under either the Worley case in Missouri, or Frier v. Procter & Gamble Distribut-
ing Co., 173 Kan. 733, 252 P.2d 850 (1953), the action could not be maintained on
a warranty theory.
41. Note 2 supra.
42. Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953).
43. See 85 F. Supp. at 711.
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A SURVEY OF THE RELEVANT LAW OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
QUALITY IN MISSOURI AND ITS EFFECT
A cause of action based upon an implied warranty of fitness other
than in food product cases generally has been hard to establish in
Missouri.44 It must be shown that the buyer made known to the seller
his particular purpose for the goods and that he relied upon the
ability of the seller to supply goods fit for that purpose. 5 The Jones
Store case held that a woman's blouse could have no particular, i.e.,
special, purpose; it has only a general purpose, to be worn by a
woman.46 Thus there could be no implied warranty of fitness in such
a situation. The court failed to consider an implied warranty that the
blouse would be fit for its general purpose, to be worn by a woman.
Likewise, saucepans for cooking have no particular purpose.47 In
Zesch v. Abrasive Co.,- it was ruled there could be no implied war-
ranty of fitness since the evidence failed to show that the abrasive
cutting-off wheel there involved had been furnished for any par-
ticular or special purpose. But the court did not say that abrasive
wheels, like blouses and saucepans, could have no special purpose.
In the Jones Store case, the defendant was a retailer, not a manu-
facturer as in Zesch and some of the other cases. 49 Retailers generally
have been protected against implied warranty liability in non-food
cases, at least where they have no greater knowledge about the goods
than the buyer ;50 this is the general common law viewE1 Whether the
claimed implied warranty involved be called fitness or merchantability,
the result has been the same; the retailer is not held unless he had
greater knowledge about the goods than the buyer, so that the buyer
could justifiably rely upon the retailer's selection of fit goods.5 2 The
44. See, e.g., Dotson v. International Harvester Co., 365 Mo. 625, 285 S.W.2d
585 (1955); State ex rel. Jones Store Co. v. Shain, 352 Mo. 630, 179 S.W.2d 19
(1944).
45. London Guar. & Ace. Co. v. Strait Scale Co., 322 Mo. 502, 15 S.W.2d 766
(1929); Busch & Latta Painting Co. v. Woermann Constr. Co., 310 Mo. 419, 276
S.W. 614 (1925); Hunter v. Waterloo Gasoline Engine Co., 260 S.W. 970 (Mo.
1924); Dubinsky v. Lindburg Cadillac Co., 250 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952);
Davies v. Motor Radio Co., 236 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951).
46. See note 7 supra.
47. 352 Mo. at 635, 179 S.W.2d at 21.
48. 353 Mo. 558, 183 S.W.2d 140 (1944).
49. See the London Guar. and Busch & Latta cases cited in note 45 supra.
50. Dotson v. International Harvester Co., 365 Mo. 625, 285 S.W.2d 585 (1955).
Cf. De Gouveia v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 231 Mo. App. 447, 100 S.W.2d 336
(1936) (packaged food product case hqlding a retailer liable).
51. White v. Oakes, 88 Me. 367, 34 Ati. 175 (1896); Phares v. Sandia Lumber
Co., 62 N.M. 90, 305 P.2d 367 (1956).
52. The Uniform Sales Act § 15(2) applicable to a seller "whether he be the
grower or manufacturer or not" has changed the common law as far as actions
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Jones Store case fits this picture perfectly, since the Jones Store had
no greater knowledge about the blouse and its fitness for plaintiff-
buyer's skin than she did. The Jones Store was not responsible for
the blouse, at least as far as consequential tort-like damages are con-
cerned. The court's language in the Jones Store case regarding special
purposes may have been somewhat broad, but it means simply that
the defendant retailer could impliedly warrant nothing about the
blouse which could cover the buyer's skin injuries. The court did not
imply that the manufacturer of the blouse would not be held. In the
Zesch case, the court intimated that the manufacturer could have been
held had there been evidence in fact that the abrasive wheel was
furnished for a disclosed special purpose.
The Jones Store and Zesch cases could not command the result
reached in McIntyre, an action against a manufacturer, in what should
have been considered as a packaged food product case. The exploding
bottle was defective, the particular purpose of human consumption
was disclosed by the "realities and demands of modern society"" and
recognized by the common law,54 and the McIntyre family relied upon
the Coca-Cola Bottling Co. to furnish a fit product. The line of Mis-
souri courts of appeals decisions discussed above called for liability
in the McIntyre case.
Similarly, the Jones Store and Zeseh cases, even without the M.F.A.
Milling Co. case, do not preclude an implied warranty in the Philip
Morris case. Of course, they do not command one either.
The United States Court for the Western District of Missouri recog-
nized an implied warranty against Philip Morris Co. based upon the
Missouri Supreme Court's ruling in the M.F.A. Milling Co. case."
There is no more reason for the M.F.A. Milling Co. case to control
the Philip Morris case than there was for the Jones Store case to con-
trol the McIntyre case. The M.F.A. Milling Co. case involved no ap-
parent privity problem. It involved a package food product, albeit for
fish. The court merely recognized that an implied warranty may be
annexed by a trade custom or usage. There is no such trade custom
or usage applicable to cigarettes; the general impression is that ciga-
rettes per se are or may be harmful. True, the fish food was not sold
in its raw state, but its failure as a "complete" fish food was the
crucial factor. The case comes close to presenting a question of im-
against retailers are concerned. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388,
175 N.E. 105 (1931).
53. Williams v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 285 S.W.2d at 55. The quote is set out
in context supra at note 35.
54. Farrell v. Manhattan MIk. Co., 198 Mass. 271, 84 N.E. 481 (1908) ; Rinaldi
v. Mohican Co., 225 N.Y. 70, 121 N.E. 471 (1918).
55. See discussion of the Philip Morris and M.F.A. Milling Co. cases supra
at notes 16-27.
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plied warranty of identity, i.e., whether the fish food sold under cir-
cumstances indicating it was a "complete" fish food met that standard.
Such an implied warranty of identity is recognized in Missouri."
When the subject matter of the sale is something other than a food
product, privity is required by the Missouri cases in an action on an
implied warranty of quality. 7 In actions against manufacturers
where privity is present, implied warranties of fitness once established
are applied with little hesitation. 8 In actions against retailers, con-
tract-type damages alone are recoverable in other than food product
cases." The Philip Morris case fits none of these categories.
CONCLUSION
The law of implied warranty of quality in Missouri today generally
is satisfactory. Some improvements could be made. Kansas, also
without the Uniform Sales Act, has extended the principle of the
packaged food product cases to wholesalers and to hair dye for human
use.-' The Philip Morris decision, even though it cannot be supported
under existing Missouri law, may be a desirable one. The United
States Court for the Western District of Missouri is to be commended
for its courage in rendering such a decision. Supposedly, a McIntyre
result would not now be reached by this Court. The M.F.A. Milling
Co. case shows that the Supreme Court of Missouri also is moving.
Presumably, a Barton v. Dowis result would not now be reached by
that court. Such progress through the judicial system is the best that
can be hoped for when the legislature fails to act upon the problem.
56. Blackburn v. Carlson Seed Co., 321 S.W.2d 520 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
57. Alexander v. Inland Steel Co., 263 F.2d 314 (8th Cir. 1958); Smith v. Ford
Motor Co., 327 S.W.2d 535 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
58. Bankers Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Frigidaire Sales Corp., 113 F. Supp. 405
(E.D. Mo. 1953); cf. Milprint v. Donaldson Chocolate Co., 222 F.2d 898 (8th Cir.
1955).
59. Dubinsky v. Lindburg Cadillac Co., 250 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952).
60. Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954) (an action
by a customer of a beauty shop against a beauty supply distributor for injuries
caused by the use of a "Miss Clairol" preparation). The case is noted at 3 Kan.
L. Rev. 275 (1955). Allowance of actions against wholesalers may simplify service
of process upon a responsible defendant.
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